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NOTES AND COMMENTS

the majority interpretation of availability, makes this provision more
flexible to the needs of the workers, provides for minority claimants'
free exercise of their religious and moral beliefs and affirms the policy
of the Commission to require availability for suitable work only.
Had the court not applied the concept of suitability to the meaning of
availability, a contrary result would probably have been reached or if the
same result had been reached, it would have been an exception 97 to the
general interpretations. In considering this case it is important to remember that here, unlike the Swenson case, supra, which the court cited
and approved, the claimant had removed herself from 95% of the labor
market by being available for first shift work only when the custom in
the local labor market was to hire new employees for second and third
shifts only. Ordinarily these factors would have necessitated a finding
of unavailability; however, the court was not faced with this issue since
their initial finding was that the work was not suitable for the claimant. 98
Having adopted this view the court should experience no difficulty
in following the Tary case, supra, if given a similar set of facts, nor
should it encounter any difficulty in holding that religious reasons constitute good cause for voluntarily leaving employment.
This case constitutes a liberal interpretation of the North Carolina
Employment Security Law and a realistic judicial recognition of facts
which cause claimants to restrict their employability. It should enable
the North Carolina courts to give the Law a broad and liberal construction to aid in "mitigating the economic evils of unemployment." 99
THOMAS P. WALKER.

Workmen's Compensation-Death of Nightwatchman as Arising Out
of and in the Course of Employment
In a proceeding under the Georgia Workmen's Compensation Act
the evidence shoVed that a nightwatchman was murdered while drinking
coffee in a drive-in 25 feet from the premises of his employer and
100 yards from the building he was required to watch. The murder
occurred about 4:00 A.M., which was during the hours of his employment. The employer had not given him permission to leave the premises
but had given him permission to drink coffee on the premises. Compensation was allowed on the grounds that the injury arose by accident out
of and in the course of the employment.' This is typical of some of the
""' ALTair,
1
AVAiLABmirY FOR WoRK, 180 (1950).
But See 12 Ben. Ser. no. 7, 13545-N. C. R (1949) ; 7 Ben. Ser. no. 12, 9007N. C. A (1944).

" Unemp. Comp. Comm. v. J.M. Willis Barber & Beauty Shop, 219 N. C. 709,

15 S. E. 2d 4 (1941).

' U. S. Fidelity & Guaranty

Co. v. Croft, -

Ga. App. -, 91 S.E. 2d 110 (1955).
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difficult cases that are presented before workmen's compensation boards
throughout the country, and it illustrates the difficulty of construing the
rather nebulous phrase "arising out of and in the course of the employment,' t which appears in the law of almost every state as a condition
precedent to the right to receive compensation for injury arising by
accident. 2
From the genesis of the act as we know it today-in Germany in
1884-through the first State enactment in Wisconsin in 1911, to the
time of the last state enactment in Mississippi in 1948 the underlying
motive has been elimination of the burdensome common law remedies
with which the industrial worker had to contend, and to bring about a
quick and efficient means of recovery for their injuries. It was, therefore, evident from the beginning that acts must be liberally construed
so as to effectuate their purpose.3 However, as Professor Horovitch in
his book has aptly put it, ". . . the shades of Abinger and Shaw still
dictate decisions through the dogged hands of judges steeped in ancient
learning. In the minority of courts common law principles, long outworn, are brought back to deny recovery in present-day compensation
actions." 4
It is evident that by the nature of the act and the wording of this all
important phrase there can be no hard and fast rules of law, and each
decision will have to rest on its particular fact situation.5 As a consequence there has been a lack of unity among the states and even within
individual states. The courts have gradually adopted general rules or
standards to apply to the many and varying fact situations that arise, as
in street accidents, 6 meal time accidents, 7 and accidents of traveling employees.8
Regardless of their type of work, employees must establish the existence of three definite requisites before being allowed recovery,0 i.e., (1)
that claimant suffered a personal injury by accident; (2) that such injury
2 HoRovITcH, INJURY AND DF-ATi

UNDER WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAWS 72

(1944).

The North Carolina provisions are N. C. GEN. STAT. §§ 97-2(f), 3 (1929).
'Guest v. Brenner Iron & Metal Co., 241 N. C. 448, 85 S. E. 2d 596 (1955) ;
Essick v. Lexington, 232 N. C. 200, 60 S. E. 2d 106 (1950) ; Graham v. Wall. 220
N. C. 84, 16 S. E. 2d 691 (1941) ; Johnson v. Asheville Hosiery Co., 199 N. C. 38,
153 S. E. 591 (1930).

' HOROVITCH,

INJURY AND DEAT

UNDER WORKMEN'S

COMPENSATION

LAWS

viii (1944).
'Harden v. Thomasville Furniture Co., 199 N. C. 733, 735, 155 S.E. 728, 730
(1930).
'Note,
27 WASH. U. L. Q. 139 (1941) ; Annot.,
80 A. L. R. 126 (1932).
7
8
Note, 17 N. C. L. Rxv. 458 (1939).
Note, 23 N. C. L. REv. 159 (1945).
Henry v. A. C. Lawrence Leather Co., 231 N. C. 477, 57 S.E. 2d 760 (1950).
When the death is by violent means there is a rebuttable presumption of death by
accident. McGill v. Lumberton, 215 N. C. 752, 3 S.E. 2d 324 (1939). The claimant's proof can consist of attending circumstances, as when the unexplained death
is a natural and probable result of a risk of the employment. Poteete v. North State
Pyrophyllite Co., 240 N. C. 561, 82 S.E. 2d 693 (1954).
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arose in the course of the employment; (3) and that such injury arose
out of the employment.' 0
An accident within the meaning of the act is "an unlooked for and
untoward event which is not expected or designed by the injured employee."' 1 An assault is an accident within this definition when it is
without design on the workman's part even though intentionally caused
2
by another.'
"Arising out of" and "in the course of" are not synonymous and involve two ideas and two conditions, both of which must be proved by
the employee. "Arising out of" refers to the origin or cause of the accident, as springing from the work the employee is supposed to perform,
while "in the course of" refers to the time, place and circumstance under
which the injury by accident occurred.' 3 An injury therefore can occur
in the course of one's employment but not arise out of it, as when a
nightwatchman is injured while washing his car on the employer's
premises. 14
The Georgia court applied these generalities in the principal case in
affirming the Board's award of compensation. The court based its decision on an earlier Georgia case where it was said: "It has been held
that acts of ministration by a servant unto himself, such as quenching
his thirst, relieving his hunger, protecting himself from excessive cold,
or while seeking shelter from a storm during working hours, where the
employee intends to return to work after the storm passes, and numerous
others, readily conceivable, performance of which while at work is reasonably necessary to his health and comfort, are incidents of his employment and acts of service therein ... though in a sense they are personal
to himself and only remotely and indirectly conducive to the object of his
employment; and that an accidental injury sustained in the performance
of such an act is compensable as one incurred in the course of the employment and resulting therefrom."' 5 The court stated that since the
"°
Anderson v. Northwestern Motor Co., 233 N. C. 372, 64 S. E. 2d 265 (1951) ;
Withers v. Black, 230 N. C. 428, 53 S.E. 2d 668 (1949) ; Taylor v. Wake Forest,
228 N. C. 346, 45 S. E. 2d 387 (1947) ; Wilson v. Mooresville, 222 N. C. 283, 22

S. E. 2d 907 (1942).
" Gabriel v. Newton, 227 N. C. 314, 316, 42 S.E. 2d 96, 97 (1947) ; Brown v.
Carolina Aluminum Co., 224 N. C. 766, 767, 32 S.E. 2d '320, 322 (1949). The
act does not contemplate recovery for all injuries, but only those by accident arising
out of and in the course of the employment. Bryan v. Loving Co., 222 N. C. 724,
24 S.E. 2d 751 (1943).
"Withers v.Black, 230 N. C. 428, 53 S.E. 2d 668 (1949) ; Geltman v. Reliable

Linen Supply Co., 128 N. J.L. 443, 25 A. 2d 894 (1942) (motorist assaulted by
another motorist) ; Pinkerton Nat. Detective Agency v. Walker, 157 Ga. 548, 122
S. E. 202 (1924).
" Lewter v. Abercrombie Enterprises, Inc., 240 N. C. 399, 82 S. E. 2d 410
(1954) ; Sweatt v. Rutherford County Board of Education, 237 N. C. 653, 75 S. E.
2d 738 (1953) ; Bell v. Dewey Bros., 236 N. C. 280, 72 S.E. 2d 680 (1952).
" Bell v. Dewey Bros., 236 N. C. 280, 72 S.E. 2d 680 (1952).
" Carter v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 47 Ga. App. 367, 368, 170 S.E. 535, 536
(1933).
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watchman did not tarry long he was still in the course of his employment; and since it is a common hazard of a nightwatchman's job that
he be set upon by robbers or burglars, it arose out of the employment.
A contributing factor was that the deceased could survey most of the
building from where he was sitting in the drive-in.
This seems to be an extreme case in that it allows recovery by an
employee whose duty is to guard his employer's property, but who has
completely left the premises of his employer and is attacked by someone
who, so far as appears, had no intention of trespassing on the employer's
property. However, the decision is commendable from a policy viewpoint, because it broadly interprets the key words of the act and more
nearly effectuates its desired purposes."0 There was a dissent on the
grounds that the watchman had abandoned his employment, that the
injury was directed against the watchman for purely personal reasons,
7
and thus, that the accident did not arise out of the employment.'
North Carolina apparently would not be so liberal. In Smith v.
Newman Machinery Co.1s almost the same situation arose with the exception that the store was on the employer's premises. There the court
recognized the special hazard of the watchman but said: ".

.

. the facts

in the case at bar disclose that he was not making his rounds at the time
of the injury or performing any service for his employer, 'u 9 and denied
recovery.
"' HoRoviTcH, INJURY AND DEATH UNDER WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAWS
vii. "The author does not argue for unlimited liability in all cases. But if some
of the judges could be present in the classrooms where compensation cases are being
discussed before law students or students in economics, and hear the reactions of
those who will dominate the scene when we are no longer here, they would cease
their attempt to fly in the face of common sense, and stop introducing narrow
common-law rulings into compensation cases. They would no longer attempt to
stem the tide of reasonable liberailty which the acts promised, and which should
have arrived at our shores generations ago .... An ashman's widow cannot understand how an intelligent judge can rule that she and the five children must go on
charity because her husband did not wait for the employer's truck to stop, but had
jumped off when it was going three and one-half miles an hour, in order to rush
or facilitate his work. To tell her it was an 'added risk' is to raise her contempt
for the law." For a criticism of this work see Malone, Book Review, 23 N. C. L.
REv. 173 (1945).
nor shall 'injury' and 'personal in"...
7 GA. CODE ANN. § 114-102 (1920).
jury' include injury caused by the wilfull act of a third person directed against an
employee for reasons personal to such employee." The North Carolina Act does
not contain this provision but the court has judicially interpreted the Act in accord
with it. Harden v. Thomasville Furniture Co., 199 N. C. 733, 155 S. E. 728 (1930).
For other cases see note 23 infra.
8206 N. C. 97, 172 S. E. 880 (1932). This case has not been cited in a single
decision since it was decided.
" Id. at 99, 172 S. E. at 881. Nightwatchmen are generally given a liberal
treatment by the courts in view of their hazardous activity. As the North Carolina
Court has described it, they are "within the zone of special danger." Bain v. Travora Mfg. Co., 203 N. C. 466, 468, 166 S. E. 301, 302 (1932) ; West v. East Coast
Fertilizer Co., 201 N. C. 556, 559, 160 S. E. 765, 766 (1931). Some states require,
either by legislative enactment or by judicial interpretation, that the worker be
employed in a hazardous or extrahazardous occupation in order to be covered by
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Generally, an assault inflicted on a workman by a third person is
regarded as "accidental" within the meaning of the act.2 0 Also, it meets
the "arising out of" requirement when the employment is such as naturally to invite an assault, as when the employee is protecting his employer's property. and the assault naturally results because of the employment and not because of something unconnected with it.21 But if
the assault is unconnected with the employment or is for other reasons
personal to the employee and the assailant, it generally does not arise
out of the employment. 22 In such case the employment is not the cause
23
of the assault, though it may be the occasion thereof.
The North Carolina Court has laid down the following test for determining whether an accidental injury arises out of an employment:
"There must be some causal relation between the employment and the
injury; but if the injury is one which, after the event, may be seen to
have had its origin in the employment, it need not be shown that it is
one which ought to have been forseen or expected." 24 Of course, it is in
the application of this test that the court has difficulty. The decisions
both by the Commission and the courts seem to be wholly inconsistent
at times, as can be seen by a few pertinent examples. Recovery was
denied when an employee, who was in his car ready to leave the plant,
the act. Hoffman v. Hazelwood, 139 Or. 519, 10 P. 2d 349 (1932) ; Annot., 83
A. L. R. 1018, 1067 (1933) (concerning watchmen as being within the classification
of hazardous duty). The North Carolina Act does not distinguish between hazardous and non-hazardous employment.
-0Cases cited note 13 supra. Beem v. H. D. Lee Mercantile Co., 337 Mo. 114,
85 S. W. 2d 441 (1935); Indian Territory Illuminating Oil Co. v. Jordan, 140
Okla. 238, 283 Pa.c. 240 (1929).
" American Mut. Ins. Co. v. Smith, 54 Ga. App. 320, 187 S. E. 724 (1936)
(watchman killed while making rounds) ; Griffin v. McLellan Stores, 1 1. C. 144
(1929), N. C. W. C. A. Ann. 41 (1955) (store walker stabbed while apprehending
thief) ; Todd v. Eastern Furniture Mfg. Co., 147 Md. 352, 128 Atl. 42 (1925)
(watchman killed by personal enemy; compensable because of nature of employment).
2"New v. Crystal Ice & Coal Co., A-785 (Feb., 1942), N. C. W. C. A. Ann. 42
(1955) (claimant injured in fight after he had been fired or quit) ; Neill v. Ragland
Const. Co., 216 N. C. 744, 6 S. E. 2d 491 (1940) (two watchmen in dispute over
matter foreign to their employment) ; I. T. I. 0. Co. v. Lewis, 165 Okla. 26, 24
P. 2d 647 (1932) (watchman shot for unknown reason) ; Tise v. Newman Machine
Co., 1 I. C. 237 (1930), N. C. W. C. A. Ann. 42 (1955) (fight having no relation
to employment); January-Wood Co. v. Schumacher, 231 Ky. 705, 22 S.W. 2d 117
(1929)

(watchman killed by wife's paramour) ; Pioneer Coal Co. v. Hardesty, 77

Ind. App. 205, 133 N. E. 398 (1921)

(watchman killed for personal reasons).

" The courts seldom apply the "but for" test as laid down in a New Jersey decision. The claimant was employed at a butcher shop and was shot in the eye by
an arrow as he was burning trash in the backyard of the shop. The court said:
"But for the employment, the appellant would not have been in the backyard and in
the path of the arrow." Gargiulo v. Gargiulo, 24 N. J. Super. 129, 93 A. 2d 598
(1952), aff'd, 12 N. J. 807, 97 A. 2d 593 (1953).
2" Withers v. Black. 230 N. C. 428, 433, 53 S. E. 2d 668, 672 (1949) ; Conrad
v. Cook-Lewis Foundry Co., 198 N. C. 723, 726, 153 S. E. 266, 269 (1930). It is
not necessary that the employment be the sole cause of the injury, just so it is a
contributing cause. Mississippi Products, Inc. v. Gordy. - Miss. -, 80 So. 2d
793 (1955).
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got out and slipped on a fruit peeling after having been beckoned to by
a watchman ;25 but was allowed when an employee slipped on oil in the
street as he was going for the mail. 26 Also, recovery was denied when
an employer was stabbed in the back for an unknown reason while he
was working in a mill;27 but was allowed when a nightwatchman was
29
28
killed by an unknown assailant, or a robber.
In those cases where the accident has been brought about by means
other than an assault, the test of whether it arises out of and in the course
of the employment is the same as in the assault cases. There was no
recovery where a nightwatchman fell asleep on a train track and was
killed by a passing train ;3o where a nightwatchman was bitten by a spider
while engaged in his work;31 and where a watchman was sitting in a
chair in front of defendant's garage waiting until he was to make his
next round, and was struck by a wheel that ran off the axle of a passing
car.3 2 It was thought that in these cases causal connection was absent.
But where a cemetery keeper was run over by a car as he was crossing
the street to the funeral home, the risk was incidental to the employment
83
and arose out of the employment.
The fact that the employee is performing personal acts for his own
benefit will not in itself bar recovery.34 The court relied heavily on this
- Lockey v. Cohen, Goldman & Co., 213 N. C. 356, 359, 196 S. E. 342, 344
"When an injury cannot fairly be traced to the employment as a contributing proximate cause, or comes from a hazard to which the workman would have
been equally exposed apart from the employment, or from a hazard common to
others, it does not arise out of the employment." Id. at 359, 196 S. E. at 344.
"6Clinton v. Shuford Nat. Bank, 9304 (Sept., 1940), N. C. W. C. A. Ann. 39
(1955). The Commission distinguished the Lockey case, supra note 25, on the
grounds that it was not clear there whether or not the employee was on duty at
the time of the accident.
"' Phillips v. Highland Plc. Mfg. Co., 9129 (May, 1940), N. C. W. C. A. Ann. 42
(1955).
" Stanland v. Wilmington Term. Whse. Co., 2 I. C. 331 (1931), N. C. W. C. A.
Ann. 42 (1955).
" West v. East Coast Fertilizer Co., 201 N. C. 556, 160 S. E. 765 (1931)
accord, Malloy v. Caldwell Wingate Co., 284 App. Div. 798, 135 N. Y. S. 2d 445
(1954) (watchman found dead one story below where he usually worked) ; Schmitt
v. Bay Ridge Hospital, 277 App. Div. 957, 99 N. Y. S. 2d 632 (1950) (watchman
found dead at foot of stairs where his work might well have taken him, even though
it was on a public street) ; Southern Cotton Oil Co. v. Bruce, 249 Ala. 675, 32 So.
2d 666 (1947) (watchman accidentally shot by young son of watchman's employer).
"' Davis v. Elk-Dixie Furniture Corp., 3768 (Sept. 16, 1933), N. C. W. C. A.
Ann. 36 (1955).
"Howard v. Statesville Flour Mills Co., 4869 (Nov. 3, 1934), N. C. W. C. A.
Ann. 37 (1955).
" Bunting v. State Hwy. & P. W. Comm., 9526 (July, 1940), N. C. W. C. A.
Ann. 37 (1955).
" Bell v. Dewey Bros., 236 N. C. 280, 72 S. E. 2d 680 (1952).
" Naranja Rock Co. v. Dawal Farms, Inc., 74 So. 2d 282 (Fla., 1954) ; Wamhoff v. Wagner Electric Corporation, 354 Mo. 711, 190 S. W. 2d 915 (1945);
McCarter v. Ruby Cotton Mills, Inc., A-1405 (Dec. 28, 1942), N. C. W. C. A. Ann.
44 (1955) ; Keel v. Brown Paving Co., 9963 (Jan., 1941), N. C. W. C. A. Ann. 44
(1955); Clews v. Blythe Bros. Co., 8609 (April, 1939), N. C. W .C. A. Ann. 44
(1955) ; McKinley v. Belk's Dept. Store, 5676 (Sept., 1935), N. C. W. C. A. Ann.

(1938).
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principle in the present case. Usually if he has abandoned his work.
completely he will be unable to recover. 35 It is not necessary that the employee be in the exact spot designated by the employer; but in the cases
that have arisen in North Carolina the court has been careful to say that
the employee was in a place where he had a right to be. 36 It is generally
stated that if the injury has no relation to or connection with the employment and is undertaken solely for the pleasure and convenience of the
employee or a third person, it is not compensable.3 7 However, if it is
done pursuant to continued acquiescence by the employer, the result is
sometimes different.

38

North Carolina, both at Commission and court level, has held generally to the narrower view in the type of cases under consideration in
this note. The principal case seems to lean toward a far broader construction of the act and on its exact facts seems to reach a desirable
result. However, as was said above, the purpose of the act is not to place
upon the employers the burden of absolute liability for all injuries to
their employees,3 9 so there must be a dividing line, and each case must
be decided separately. This will naturally produce inconsistencies, and
it will take time and experience to harmonize the various fact situations
with the standards that are set up.
HAMLIN WADE.

44 (1955) ; In Re Bollman, 73 Ind. App. 46, 126 N. E. 639 (1920). But see Hanson v. Globe Indemnity Co., 85 Ga. App. 179, 68 S. E. 2d 179 (1951) (injury sustained during fifteen minute rest period not compensable). The courts sometimes
make a distinction, which seems to be unreasonable, between injuries sustained
during a definite rest period and those sustained while stopping work specifically to
do certain personal acts.
" Vollmer v. City of Milwaukee, 254 Wis. 162, 35 N. W. 2d 304 (1948) ; Stallcup v. Carolina Wood Turning Co., 217 N. C. 302, 7 S. E. 2d 550 (1940; Smith
v. Hauser & Co., 206 N. C. 562, 174 S.E. 455 (1934); Pittsburgh Coal Co. of
Illinois v. Industrial Commission, 323 Ill. 54, 153 N. E. 630 (1926). Compensation
probably was denied in these cases because the injury was not in the course of the
employment.
" Howell v. Standard Ice & Fuel Co., 226 N. C. 730, 40 S. E. 2d 197 (1946);
Brown v. Carolina Aluminum Co., 224 N. C. 766, 32 S. E. 2d 320 (1944) ; Gordon
v. Thomasville Repair Co., 205 N. C. 739, 172 S. E. 485 (1934).
" Bell v. Dewey Bros., 236 N. C. 280, 72 S. E. 2d 680 (1952) ; Montgomery v.
Maryland Casualty Co., 39 Ga. App. 210, 146 S. E. 504 (1929) ; Guiliano v. Daniel
O'connell's Sons, 105 Conn. 695, 136 Ati. 677 (1927) ; Kraft v. West Hotel Co.,
193 Iowa 1288, 188 N. W. 870 (1922). But compare Puffin v. General Electric Co.,
132 Conn. 279, 43 A. 2d 746 (1945), where claimant was allowed recovery for
severe burns suffered as a result of lighting a cigarette and setting fire to her
angora sweater while she was in the rest room on the employer's premises during
her employment.
"Wamhoff v. Wagner Electric Corporation, 354 Mo. 711, 190 S. W. 2d 915
(1945) ; Annot., 161 A. L. R. 1461 (1945) ; Peppers v. Wiggins Drug Stores, Inc.,
1 I. C. 164 (1929), N. C. W. C. A. Ann. 54 (1955) ; Taylor v. Hogan Milling Co.,
129 Kan. 370, 282 Pac. 729 (1929).
" The English counterpart to the American Workmen's Compensation Acts also
requires that the injury must be by accident arising out of and in the course of the
employment, but there is one notable distinction. The accident is presumed, in the
absence of evidence to the contrary, to have arisen out of the employment once it
is proved to have been in the course of the employment. National Insurance (Industrial Injuries) Act, 1946 (c. 62) § 7(4).

